must be just or fallacious according to his abilities; but which must
yet have the same effect upon his belief, which they will influence, not
in proportion to their real strength, but to the confidence placed in
them by himself.

There is only one case, my lords, in which, by the common course of
proceedings, any regard is had to mere belief; and this evidence is only
accepted on that occasion, because no other can possibly be obtained.
When any claim is to be determined by written evidences, of which, in
order to prove their validity, it is necessary to inquire by whom they
were drawn or signed; those who are acquainted with the writing of a
dead person, are admitted to deliver, upon oath, their _belief_ that the
writing ascribed to him, was or was not his; but such secondary
witnesses are never called, when the person can be produced whose hand
is to be proved.

There is yet another reason for which it is improper to admit such
evidence as this bill has a tendency to promote. It is well known, that
in all the courts of common law, the person accused is in some degree
secured from the danger of being overborne by false accusations, by the
penalty which may be inflicted upon witnesses discovered to be perjured;
but in the method of examination now proposed, a method unknown to the
constitution, no such security can be obtained, for there is no
provision made by the laws for the punishment of a man who shall give
false evidence before a committee of the house of commons.

It may likewise be observed, that this bill wants one of the most
essential properties of a law, perspicuity and determinate meaning; here
is an indemnity promised to those who shall discover _all_ that they
_know, remember, or believe_. A very extensive demand, and which may,