under the statute of 1796, punishable with fine; and not a larceny, as
charged against me in this indictment.

Several witnesses were called who had known me in Philadelphia, to
testify as to my good character. The District Attorney was very anxious
to get out of these witnesses whether they had never heard me spoken of
as a man likely to run away with slaves? And it did come out from one of
them that, from the tenor of my conversation, it used sometimes to be
talked over, that one day or other it "would heave up" that I had helped
off some negro to a free state. But these conversations, the witness
added, were generally in a jesting tone; and another witness stated that
the charge of running off slaves was a common joke among the watermen.

According to the practice in the Maryland criminal courts,--and the same
practice prevails in the District of Columbia,--the judge does not
address the jury at all. After the evidence is all in, the counsel,
before arguing the case, may call upon the judge to give to the jury
instructions as to the law. These instructions, which are offered in
writing, and argued by the counsel, the judge can give or refuse, as he
sees fit, or can alter them to suit himself; but any such refusal or
alteration furnishes ground for a bill of exceptions, on which the case,
if a verdict is given against the prisoner, may be carried by writ of
error before the Circuit Court of the District, for their revisal.

My counsel asked of the judge no less than fourteen instructions on
different points of law, ten of which the judge refused to give, and
modified to suit himself. Several of these related to the true
definition of theft, or what it was that makes a taking larceny.

It was contended by my counsel, and they asked the judge to instruct the