jury, that, to convict me of larceny, it must be proved that the taking
the slaves on board the Pearl was with the intent to convert them to my
own use, and to derive a gain from such conversion; and that, if they
believed that the slaves were received on board with the design to help
them to escape to a free state, then the offence was not larceny, but a
violation of the statute of 1796.

This instruction, variously put, was six times over asked of the judge,
and as often refused. He was no less anxious than the District Attorney
to convict me of larceny, and send me to the penitentiary. But, having a
vast deal more sense than the District Attorney, he saw that the idea
that I had carried off these negroes to sell them again for my own
profit was not tenable. It was plain enough that my intention was to
help them to escape. The judge therefore, who did not lack ingenuity,
went to work to twist the law so as, if possible, to bring my case
within it. Even he did not venture to say that merely to assist slaves
to escape was stealing. Stealing, he admitted, must be a taking, _lucri
causa_, for the sake of gain; but--so he told the jury in one of his
instructions--"this desire of gain need not be to convert the article
taken to his--the taker's--own use, nor to obtain for the thief the
value in money of the thing stolen. If the act was prompted by a desire
to obtain for himself, or another even, other than the owner, a money
gain, or any other inducing advantage, a dishonest gain, then the act
was a larceny." And, in another instruction, he told the jury, "that if
they believed, from the evidence, that the prisoner, before receiving
the slaves on board, imbued their minds with discontent, persuaded them
to go with him, and, by corrupt influences and inducements, caused them
to come to his ship, and then took and carried them down the river, then
the act was a larceny."