taking matter to be the name of something really existing under that
precision, has no doubt produced those obscure and unintelligible
discourses and disputes, which have filled the heads and books of
philosophers concerning materia prima; which imperfection or abuse,
how far it may concern a great many other general terms I leave to be
considered. This, I think, I may at least say, that we should have a
great many fewer disputes in the world, if words were taken for what
they are, the signs of our ideas only; and not for things themselves.
For, when we argue about MATTER, or any the like term, we truly argue
only about the idea we express by that sound, whether that precise idea
agree to anything really existing in nature or no. And if men would tell
what ideas they make their words stand for, there could not be half that
obscurity or wrangling in the search or support of truth that there is.


16. This makes Errors lasting.

But whatever inconvenience follows from this mistake of words, this I am
sure, that, by constant and familiar use, they charm men into notions
far remote from the truth of things. It would be a hard matter to
persuade any one that the words which his father, or schoolmaster, the
parson of the parish, or such a reverend doctor used, signified nothing
that really existed in nature: which perhaps is none of the least causes
that men are so hardly drawn to quit their mistakes, even in opinions
purely philosophical, and where they have no other interest but truth.
For the words they have a long time been used to, remaining firm in
their minds, it is no wonder that the wrong notions annexed to them
should not be removed.