17. Fifthly, by setting them in the place of what they cannot signify.

V. FIFTHLY, Another abuse of words is, THE SETTING THEM IN THE PLACE OF
THINGS WHICH THEY DO OR CAN BY NO MEANS SIGNIFY. We may observe that, in
the general names of substances, whereof the NOMINAL essences are only
known to us, when we put them into propositions, and affirm or deny
anything about them, we do most commonly tacitly suppose or intend, they
should stand for the REAL essence of a certain sort of substances.
For, when a man says gold is malleable, he means and would insinuate
something more than this, That what I call gold is malleable, (though
truly it amounts to no more,) but would have this understood, viz.
That gold, i.e. what has the real essence of gold, is malleable; which
amounts to thus much, that malleableness depends on, and is inseparable
from the real essence of gold. But a man, not knowing wherein that real
essence consists, the connexion in his mind of malleableness is not
truly with an essence he knows not, but only with the sound gold he puts
for it. Thus, when we say that ANIMAL RATIONALE is, and animal imflume
bipes latis unguibus is not a good definition of a man; it is plain we
suppose the name man in this case to stand for the real essence of a
species, and would signify that 'a rational animal' better described
that real essence than 'a two-legged animal with broad nails, and
without feathers.' For else, why might not Plato as properly make the
word [word in Greek], or MAN, stand for his complex idea, made up of the
idea of a body, distinguished from others by a certain shape and other
outward appearances, as Aristotle make the complex idea to which he gave
the name [word in Greek], or MAN, of body and the faculty of reasoning
joined together; unless the name [word in Greek], or MAN, were supposed
to stand for something else than what it signifies; and to be put in the
place of some other thing than the idea a man professes he would express
by it?