another uses to me, or else he is to tell me. And if I know that the
name gold stands for this complex idea of body, yellow, heavy, fusible,
malleable, it will not much instruct me to put it solemnly afterwards in
a proposition, and gravely say, all gold is fusible. Such propositions
can only serve to show the disingenuity of one who will go from the
definition of his own terms, by reminding him sometimes of it; but carry
no knowledge with them, but of the signification of words, however
certain they be.


6. Instance, Man and Palfrey.

'Every man is an animal, or living body,' is as certain a proposition as
can be; but no more conducing to the knowledge of things than to say, a
palfrey is an ambling horse, or a neighing, ambling animal, both being
only about the signification of words, and make me know but this--That
body, sense, and motion, or power of sensation and moving, are three of
those ideas that I always comprehend and signify by the word man: and
where they are not to be found together, the NAME MAN belongs not to
that thing: and so of the other--That body, sense, and a certain way of
going, with a certain kind of voice, are some of those ideas which I
always comprehend and signify by the WORD PALFREY; and when they are not
to be found together, the name palfrey belongs not to that thing. It is
just the same, and to the same purpose, when any term standing for any
one or more of the simple ideas, that altogether make up that complex
idea which is called man, is affirmed of the term man:--v.g. suppose a
Roman signified by the word HOMO all these distinct ideas united in one
subject, CORPORIETAS, SENSIBILITAS, POTENTIA SE MOVENDI, RATIONALITAS,
RISIBILITAS; he might, no doubt, with great certainty, universally
affirm one, more, or all of these together of the word HOMO, but did no