There is a school of politicians who imagine that Great Britain's
weakness can be supplemented from other parts of the British Empire.
That is an idea which ought not to be received without the most careful
examination and in my judgment must, except within narrow limits, be
rejected.

In a war between Great Britain and a continental State or combination
the assistance which Great Britain could possibly receive from the
King's dominions beyond the sea is necessarily limited. Such a war must
in the first place be a naval contest, towards which the most that the
colonies can contribute consists in such additions to Great Britain's
naval strength as they may have given during the preceding period of
peace. What taken together they may do in this way would no doubt make
an appreciable difference in the balance of forces between the two
contending navies; but in the actual struggle the colonies would be
little more than spectators, except in so far as their ports would offer
a certain number of secure bases for the cruisers upon which Great
Britain must rely for the protection of her sea-borne trade. Even if all
the colonies possessed first-rate armies, the help which those armies
could give would not be equal to that obtainable from a single European
ally. For a war against a European adversary Great Britain must rely
upon her own resources, and upon such assistance as she might obtain if
it were felt by other Powers on the Continent not only that the cause in
which she was fighting was vital to them and therefore called for their
co-operation, but also that in the struggle Great Britain's assistance
would be likely to turn the scale in their favour.

Can we expect that history will repeat itself, and that once more in
case of conflict Great Britain will have the assistance of continental
allies? That depends chiefly on their faith in her power to help them.