One condition of such an alliance undoubtedly exists--the desire of
other nations for it. The predominance of Germany on the Continent
rests like a nightmare upon more than one of the other States. It is
increased by the alliance of Austria, another great military empire--an
empire, moreover, not without a fine naval tradition, and, as is proved
by the recent announcement of the intention of the Austrian Government
to build four "Dreadnoughts," resolved to revive that tradition.

Against the combination of Germany and Austria, Russia, which has hardly
begun to recover from the prostration of her defeat by Japan, is
helpless; while France, with a population much smaller than that of
Germany, can hardly look forward to a renewal single-handed of the
struggle which ended for her so disastrously forty years ago. The
position of Italy is more doubtful, for the sympathies of her people are
not attracted by Austria; they look with anxiety upon the Austrian
policy of expansion towards the Aegean and along the shore of the
Adriatic. The estrangement from France which followed upon the French
occupation of Tunis appears to have passed away, and it seems possible
that if there were a chance of success Italy might be glad to emancipate
herself from German and Austrian influence. But even if Germany's policy
were such that Russia, France, and Italy were each and all of them
desirous to oppose it, and to assert a will and a policy of their own
distinct from that of the German Government, it is very doubtful whether
their strength is sufficient to justify them in an armed conflict,
especially as their hypothetical adversaries have a central position
with all its advantages. From a military point of view the strength of
the central position consists in the power which it gives to its holder
to keep one opponent in check with a part of his forces while he throws
the bulk of them into a decisive blow against another.