anxious for oversea possessions and spheres of influence, and appears to
have thought that if Morocco was to become a European protectorate she
ought to have a voice in any settlement. The terms in which the English
consent to the French design was expressed were construed by the
German's as involving, on the part of Great Britain, just that kind of
supremacy in regard to oversea affairs which they had for so many years
been learning to dislike. At any rate, when the moment convenient to her
came, Germany put her veto upon the arrangements which had been made and
required that they should be submitted to a European Conference. France
was not prepared to renew the struggle for existence over Morocco, while
Germany appeared not unwilling to assert her will even by force.
Accordingly Germany had her way.

The annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary again
afforded an opportunity for the exercise of Germany's preponderance. In
1878 the Treaty of Berlin had authorised Austria-Hungary to occupy and
administer the two provinces without limitation of time, and Bosnia and
Herzegovina have since then practically been Austrian provinces, for the
male population has been subject to compulsory service in the Austrian
army and the soldiers have taken the oath of allegiance to the Emperor.
It is not clear that any of the great Powers had other than a formal
objection to the annexation, the objection, namely, that it was not
consistent with the letter of the Treaty of Berlin. The British
Government pointed out that, by international agreement to which
Austria-Hungary is a party, a European Treaty is not to be modified
without the consent of all the signatory Powers, and that this consent
had not been asked by Austria-Hungary. The British view was endorsed
both by France and Russia, and these three Powers were in favour of a
European Conference for the purpose of revising the clause of the Treaty
of Berlin, and apparently also of giving some concessions to Servia and