lightning, and when I am afraid of them, what do I do then except to
recognize my master like the runaway slave? But so long as I have any
respite from these terrors, as a runaway slave stands in the theatre, so
do I. I bathe, I drink, I sing; but all this I do with terror and
uneasiness. But if I shall release myself from my masters, that is from
those things by means of which masters are formidable, what further
trouble have I, what master have I still?

What then, ought we to publish these things to all men? No, but we ought
to accommodate ourselves to the ignorant ([Greek: tois idiotais]) and to
say: "This man recommends to me that which he thinks good for himself. I
excuse him." For Socrates also excused the jailer who had the charge of
him in prison and was weeping when Socrates was going to drink the
poison, and said, "How generously he laments over us." Does he then say
to the jailer that for this reason we have sent away the women? No, but
he says it to his friends who were able to hear (understand) it; and he
treats the jailer as a child.

* * * * *

THAT CONFIDENCE (COURAGE) IS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH CAUTION.--The opinion
of the philosophers perhaps seem to some to be a paradox; but still let
us examine as well as we can, if it is true that it is possible to do
everything both with caution and with confidence. For caution seems to
be in a manner contrary to confidence, and contraries are in no way
consistent. That which seems to many to be a paradox in the matter under
consideration in my opinion is of this kind; if we asserted that we
ought to employ caution and confidence in the same things, men might
justly accuse us of bringing together things which cannot be united. But
now where is the difficulty in what is said? for if these things are