true, which have been often said and often proved, that the nature of
good is in the use of appearances, and the nature of evil likewise, and
that things independent of our will do not admit either the nature of
evil or of good, what paradox do the philosophers assert if they say
that where things are not dependent on the will, there you should employ
confidence, but where they are dependent on the will, there you should
employ caution? For if the bad consists in the bad exercise of the will,
caution ought only to be used where things are dependent on the will.
But if things independent of the will and not in our power are nothing
to us, with respect to these we must employ confidence; and thus we
shall both be cautious and confident, and indeed confident because of
our caution. For by employing caution towards things which are really
bad, it will result that we shall have confidence with respect to things
which are not so.

We are then in the condition of deer; when they flee from the huntsmen's
feathers in fright, whither do they turn and in what do they seek refuge
as safe? They turn to the nets, and thus they perish by confounding
things which are objects of fear with things that they ought not to
fear. Thus we also act: in what cases do we fear? In things which are
independent of the will. In what cases on the contrary do we behave with
confidence, as if there were no danger? In things dependent on the will.
To be deceived then, or to act rashly, or shamelessly, or with base
desire to seek something, does not concern us at all, if we only hit the
mark in things which are independent of our will. But where there is
death or exile or pain or infamy, there we attempt to run away, there we
are struck with terror. Therefore, as we may expect it to happen with
those who err in the greatest matters, we convert natural confidence
(that is, according to nature) into audacity, desperation, rashness,
shamelessness; and we convert natural caution and modesty into cowardice