The last-named people, indeed, exemplified once more the rule
that a military state expanding to the sea and absorbing older
maritime populations becomes a serious menace to its neighbours.
Even in the fifteenth century Mohammed II had made an attack on
Southern Italy; but his sea-power was not equal to the undertaking.
Suleymân the Magnificent directed the Ottoman forces towards
the West. With admirable strategic insight he conquered Rhodes,
and thus freed himself from the danger of a hostile force on
his flank. 'The centenary of the conquest of Constantinople was
past, and the Turk had developed a great naval power besides
annexing Egypt and Syria.'[33] The Turkish fleets, under such
leaders as Khair-ad-din (Barbarossa), Piale, and Dragut, seemed
to command the Mediterranean including its western basin; but the
repulse at Malta in 1565 was a serious check, and the defeat at
Lepanto in 1571 virtually put an end to the prospect of Turkish
maritime dominion. The predominance of Portugal in the Indian
Ocean in the early part of the sixteenth century had seriously
diminished the Ottoman resources. The wealth derived from the trade
in that ocean, the Persian Gulf, and the Red Sea, had supplied
the Mohammedans with the sinews of war, and had enabled them to
contend with success against the Christians in Europe. 'The main
artery had been cut when the Portuguese took up the challenge
of the Mohammedan merchants of Calicut, and swept their ships
from the ocean.'[34] The sea-power of Portugal wisely employed
had exercised a great, though unperceived, influence. Though
enfeebled and diminishing, the Turkish navy was still able to act
with some effect in the seventeenth century. Nevertheless, the
sea-power of the Turks ceased to count as a factor of importance
in the relations between great states.