this was not a quality of that of the English, then their efforts
were bound to fail; and, more than this, the position of their
country, challenging as it did what was believed to be the greatest
of maritime states, would have been altogether precarious. The
principal expeditions now undertaken were distinguished by a
characteristic peculiar to the people, and not to be found in
connection with the exploring or colonising activity of most
other great nations even down to our own time. They were really
unofficial speculations in which, if the Government took part at
all, it was for the sake of the profit expected and almost, if
not exactly, like any private adventurer. The participation of
the Government, nevertheless, had an aspect which it is worth
while to note. It conveyed a hint--and quite consciously--to all
whom it might concern that the speculations were 'under-written'
by the whole sea-power of England. The forces of more than one state
had been used to protect its maritime trade from the assaults of
enemies in the Mediterranean or in the Narrow Seas. They had
been used to ward off invasion and to keep open communications
across not very extensive areas of water. In the sixteenth century
they were first relied upon to support distant commerce, whether
carried on in a peaceful fashion or under aggressive forms. This,
naturally enough, led to collisions. The contention waxed hot,
and was virtually decided when the Armada shaped course to the
northward after the fight off Gravelines.

The expeditions against the Spanish Indies and, still more, those
against Philip II's peninsular territory, had helped to define
the limitations of sea-power. It became evident, and it was made
still more evident in the next century, that for a great country
to be strong it must not rely upon a navy alone. It must also have