English commerce by the enemy; the other was Torrington's conduct
at and after the engagement off Beachy Head. Mahan discusses
the former with his usual lucidity. At no time has war against
commerce been conducted on a larger scale and with greater results
than during this period. We suffered 'infinitely more than in
any former war.' Many of our merchants were ruined; and it is
affirmed that the English shipping was reduced to the necessity
of sailing under the Swedish and Danish flags. The explanation is
that Louis XIV made great efforts to keep up powerful fleets. Our
navy was so fully occupied in watching these that no ships could
be spared to protect our maritime trade. This is only another way
of saying that our commerce had increased so largely that the
navy was not strong enough to look after it as well as oppose
the enemy's main force. Notwithstanding our losses we were on
the winning side in the conflict. Much misery and ruin had been
caused, but not enough to affect the issue of the war.

Torrington's proceedings in July 1690 were at the time the subject
of much angry debate. The debate, still meriting the epithet
angry, has been renewed within the last few years. The matter
has to be noticed here, because it involves the consideration of
a question of naval strategy which must be understood by those
who wish to know the real meaning of the term sea-power, and who
ought to learn that it is not a thing to be idly risked or thrown
away at the bidding of the ignorant and the irresponsible. Arthur
Herbert, Earl of Torrington--the later peerage is a viscounty held
by the Byng family--was in command of the allied English and Dutch
fleet in the Channel. 'The disparity of force,' says Mahan, 'was
still in favour of France in 1690, but it was not so great as
the year before.' We can measure the ability of the then English