Government for conducting a great war, when we know that, in its
wisdom, it had still further weakened our fleet by dividing it
(Vice-Admiral Killigrew having been sent to the Mediterranean with
a squadron), and had neglected, and indeed refused when urged, to
take the necessary steps to repair this error. The Government
having omitted, as even British Governments sometimes do, to
gain any trustworthy intelligence of the strength or movements
of the enemy, Torrington suddenly found himself confronted by a
considerably superior French fleet under Tourville, one of the
greatest of French sea-officers. Of late years the intentions of
the French have been questioned; but it is beyond dispute that
in England at the time Tourville's movements were believed to
be preliminary to invasion. Whether Tourville deliberately meant
his movement to cover an invasion or not, invasion would almost
certainly have followed complete success on his part; otherwise his
victory would have been without any valuable result. Torrington
saw that as long as he could keep his own fleet intact, he could,
though much weaker than his opponent, prevent him from doing
serious harm. Though personally not a believer in the imminence of
invasion, the English admiral knew that 'most men were in fear that
the French would invade.' His own view was, 'that whilst we had a
fleet in being they would not dare to make an attempt.' Of late
years controversy has raged round this phrase, 'a fleet in being,'
and the strategic principle which it expresses. Most seamen were
at the time, have been since, and still are in agreement with
Torrington. This might be supposed enough to settle the question.
It has not been allowed, however, to remain one of purely naval
strategy. It was made at the time a matter of party politics.
This is why it is so necessary that in a notice of sea-power it
should be discussed. Both as a strategist and as a tactician