The issue of the Spanish-American war, at least as regards the mere
defeat of Spain, was, perhaps, a foregone conclusion. That Spain,
even without a serious insurrection on her hands, was unequal to
the task of meeting so powerful an antagonist as the United States
must have been evident even to Spaniards. Be that as it may, an
early collapse of the Spanish defence was not anticipated, and
however one-sided the war may have been seen to be, it furnished
examples illustrating rules as old as naval warfare. Mahan says of
it that, 'while possessing, as every war does, characteristics of
its own differentiating it from others, nevertheless in its broad
analogies it falls into line with its predecessors, evidencing that
unity of teaching which pervades the art from its beginnings unto
this day.'[49] The Spaniards were defeated by the superiority
of the American sea-power. 'A million of the best soldiers,' says
Mahan, 'would have been powerless in face of hostile control of
the sea.' That control was obtained and kept by the United States
navy, thus permitting the unobstructed despatch of troops--and
their subsequent reinforcement and supply--to Spanish territory,
which was finally conquered, not by the navy, but by the army
on shore. That it was the navy which made this final conquest
possible happened, in this case, to be made specially evident
by the action of the United States Government, which stopped a
military expedition on the point of starting for Cuba until the
sea was cleared of all Spanish naval force worth attention.

[Footnote 49: _Lessons_of_the_War_with_Spain_, p. 16.]

The events of the long period which we have been considering
will have shown how sea-power operates, and what it effects.