large. Howe, in spite of the odds against him, managed to get his
supply-ships in to the anchorage and to fight a partial action, in
which he did the allies as much damage as he received. There has
never been a display of higher tactical skill than this operation
of Howe's, though, it may be said, he owes his fame much more
to his less meritorious performance on the first of June. The
revictualling of Gibraltar surpassed even Suffren's feat of the
capture of Trincomalee in the same year. In 1798 the French,
assuming that a temporary superiority in the Mediterranean had
given them a free hand on the water, sent a great expedition to
Egypt. Though the army which was carried succeeded in landing
there, the covering fleet was destroyed by Nelson at the Nile,
and the army itself was eventually forced to surrender. The French
had not perceived that, except for a short time and for minor
operations, you cannot separate the command of the Mediterranean
or of any particular area of water from that of the sea in general.
Local command of the sea may enable a belligerent to make a hasty
raid, seize a relatively insignificant port, or cut out a vessel;
but it will not ensure his being able to effect anything requiring
considerable time for its execution, or, in other words, anything
likely to have an important influence on the course of the war.
If Great Britain has not naval force enough to retain command
of the Mediterranean, she will certainly not have force enough
to retain command of the English Channel. It can be easily shown
why it should be so. In war danger comes less from conditions of
locality than from the enemy's power to hurt. Taking up a weak
position when confronting an enemy may help him in the exercise of
his power, but it does not constitute it.[57] A maritime enemy's
power to hurt resides in his fleet. If that can be neutralised
his power disappears. It is in the highest degree improbable