that this end can be attained by splitting up our own fleet into
fragments so as to have a part of it in nearly every quarter in
which the enemy may try to do us mischief. The most promising
plan--as experience has often proved--is to meet the enemy, when
he shows himself, with a force sufficiently strong to defeat
him. The proper station of the British fleet in war should,
accordingly, be the nearest possible point to the enemy's force.
This was the fundamental principle of Nelson's strategy, and it
is as valid now as ever it was. If we succeed in getting into
close proximity to the hostile fleet with an adequate force of
our own, our foe cannot obtain command of the sea, or of any
part of it, whether that part be the Mediterranean or the English
Channel, at any rate until he has defeated us. If he is strong
enough to defeat our fleet he obtains the command of the sea
in general; and it is for him to decide whether he shall show
the effectiveness of that command in the Mediterranean or in
the Channel.

[Footnote 57: In his _History_of_Scotland_ (1873). J. H. M. Burton,
speaking of the Orkney and Shetland isles in the Viking times,
says (vol. i. p. 320): 'Those who occupied them were protected,
not so much by their own strength of position, as by the complete
command over the North Sea held by the fleets that found shelter
in the fiords and firths.']

In the smaller operations of war temporary command of a particular
area of water may suffice for the success of an expedition, or
at least will permit the execution of the preliminary movements.
When the main fleet of a country is at a distance--which it ought
not to be except with the object of nearing the opposing fleet--a