and conduct of war merely because they do not state specially
that they are dealing with the naval branch of it.

A very slight knowledge of history is quite enough to make us
acquainted with the frequent recurrence of defeats and disasters
inflicted on armed forces by antagonists whose power to do so
had not been previously suspected. It has been the same on the
sea as on the land, though--owing to more copious records--we
may have a larger list of events on the latter. It will not be
denied that it is of immense importance to us to inquire how this
happened, and ascertain how--for the future--it may be rendered
highly improbable in our own case. A brief enumeration of the more
striking instances will make it plain that the events in question
have been confined to no particular age and to no particular
country.

It may be said that the more elaborately organised and trained
in peace time an armed force happened to be, the more unexpected
always, and generally the more disastrous, was its downfall.
Examples of this are to be found in the earliest campaigns of
which we have anything like detailed accounts, and they continue
to reappear down to very recent times. In the elaborate nature
of its organisation and training there probably never has been
an army surpassing that led by Xerxes into Greece twenty-four
centuries ago. Something like eight years had been devoted to
its preparation. The minute account of its review by Xerxes on
the shores of the Hellespont proves that, however inefficient
the semi-civilised contingents accompanying it may have been,
the regular Persian army appeared, in discipline, equipment,
and drill, to have come up to the highest standard of the most