country, most of whom came from England, brought with them this important
element in the establishment of justice, and it is found today in nearly
all the states.

Again, when in the boy-court the facts of the case have been established
and it becomes necessary to apply the rules of the game to the particular
case, the boys frequently, invariably in difficult cases, turn to some boy
or boys known to be well versed in the principles of the game, and defer
to his or their opinion. And, similarly, in the Folk-moot, much deference
was paid in rendering judgment to the old men who for many years had
helped to render justice, and who, in consequence, had much knowledge of
the customs, unwritten laws, in accordance with which decisions were
rendered. In this deference to one or more persons who are recognized as
understanding the principles involved in the case, we see the germ of
_judgeship_ in our present courts.

And finally, a boy naturally reserves the right, mentally or avowedly, of
_appealing_ from the decision of the boys to the teacher or his father, in
case he feels that he has been unjustly dealt with.

Thus we see that the principal elements of the courts of today, the
establishment of justice as a public trust, the determination of the facts
by means of witnesses and a jury, the application of the law by one or
more judges, the right of appeal to a higher court, are not artificial,
but in the nature of things. We inherited them from our primitive
ancestors, and in that sense they may be said to have been imposed upon
us. But their naturalness appears in the fact that boys when left to
themselves introduce the same elements into their boy-courts.