Why We Are at War (2nd Edition, revised) by Members of the Oxford Faculty of Modern History
page 101 of 302 (33%)
page 101 of 302 (33%)
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these proposals briefly. As early as July 24th M. Sazonof 'hoped that
His Majesty's Government would not fail to proclaim their solidarity with Russia and France.[142]' The French Ambassador at St. Petersburg joined in the request, and M. Sazonof pointed out that 'we would sooner or later be dragged into war if it did break out; we should have rendered war more likely if we did not from the outset make common cause with his country and with France[143].' On July 30th the President of the French Republic expressed his conviction that 'peace between the Powers is in the hands of Great Britain. If His Majesty's Government announced that England would come to the aid of France in the event of a conflict between France and Germany, as a result of the present differences between Austria and Servia, there would be no war, for Germany would at once modify her attitude[144].' Even more important was the opinion of the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, whose country was a member of the Triple Alliance:-- 'As Germany was really anxious for good relations with ourselves, if she believed that Great Britain would act with Russia and France, he thought it would have a great effect.'[145] Such opinions must, and do, carry great weight, but Sir Edward Grey and the British Ambassadors were equally firm in withstanding them. Sir George Buchanan at once told M. Sazonof that he |
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