'saw no reason to expect any declaration of solidarity from His
Majesty's Government that would entail an unconditional engagement
on their part to support Russia and France by force of arms'.[146]

On July 27th he met the proposal more directly by pointing out that, so
far from such a policy conducing to the maintenance of peace, it would
merely offend the pride of the Germans and stiffen them in their present
attitude.[147] Two days later Sir Edward Grey pointed out to M. Cambon
that

'even if the question became one between Austria and Russia, we
should not feel called upon to take a hand in it. It would then be a
question of the supremacy of Teuton or Slav--a struggle for
supremacy in the Balkans; and our idea had always been to avoid
being drawn into a war over a Balkan question'.[148]

That is one answer to the proposal, an answer based on history and on
Britain's foreign policy in past years. Sir Edward Grey had another
answer. It was to the effect that Germany could not, and ought to have
known she could not, rely on our neutrality. For when the Russian
Ambassador told him that an impression prevailed in German and Austrian
circles that in any event England would stand aside, he pointed out that

'this impression ought to be dispelled by the orders we have given
to the First Fleet, which is concentrated, as it happens, at
Portland, not to disperse for manoeuvre leave'.[149]

The situation continued to develop unfavourably for the cause of peace
owing to the Austrian declaration of war on Servia, and the consequent
mobilizations in Russia, Germany, and France. On July 31st Sir Edward