Why We Are at War (2nd Edition, revised) by Members of the Oxford Faculty of Modern History
page 103 of 302 (34%)
page 103 of 302 (34%)
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Grey said:--
'I believe it to be quite untrue that our attitude has been a decisive factor in situation. German Government do not expect our neutrality.'[150] It is not quite clear that Sir Edward Grey's belief was justified. England's attitude may have been an important factor in the situation, but still in our opinion Sir Edward Grey was not only right in refusing to commit England to a new Continental policy, but could not, with due observance of constitutional usages, have taken any other course. Again, it is doubtful whether the German Government did or did not rely on our neutrality. The German Chancellor and the German Secretary for Foreign Affairs later affected great surprise at our action. Germany, however, as we have shown above (p. 82), had been plainly warned by Sir Edward Grey on July 29th[151] that she could not rely on our remaining neutral under all circumstances. Whether Sir Edward Grey was right or wrong in his estimate of Germany's prudence is a small matter; what is important is that his action was throughout perfectly straightforward and consistent. And unquestionably he had a very difficult part to play. The near East was like a blazing rick surrounded by farm buildings; Germany was, if not stirring up the conflagration, certainly not attempting to pour water on the flames, while Austria, possibly--and even probably[152] with Germany's knowledge, would allow no one to make the attempt. It would have aided the Austrian cause more effectively in Europe and elsewhere, if the Government had communicated[153] 'the _dossier_ elucidating the Servian intrigues and the connexion between these |
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