Why We Are at War (2nd Edition, revised) by Members of the Oxford Faculty of Modern History
page 104 of 302 (34%)
page 104 of 302 (34%)
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intrigues and the murder of 28th June', which it said it held at the
disposal of the British Government.[154] For even Count Mensdorff 'admitted that, on paper, the Servian reply might seem to be satisfactory'.[155] To judge whether the Servian reply was satisfactory, it was, and is, necessary to examine the evidence on which the Austro-Hungarian Government based the accusations formulated in its note of July 23rd. But even assuming that the Austrian charges were true, as the German White Book says they are,[156] it is only a stronger reason for allowing the Powers to examine this evidence; and it does not explain the persistent refusal,[157] until July 31st,[158] to permit any negotiations on the basis of the Servian reply. Such being the situation, it is very difficult to see what more Sir Edward Grey could have done to prevent the outbreak of war between Austria-Hungary and Servia, which did inevitably, as he foresaw from the first, drag in other nations. He urged Servia to moderation and even to submission; he tried to induce the four Powers to mediate jointly at St. Petersburg and Vienna; he proposed a conference of the four Powers to prevent further complications; he did everything in his power to restrain Russia from immediate armed support of Servia; he declined to join Russia and France in eventual military action; and even up to the violation of the neutrality of Belgium he still strove to avert the horrors of war from Europe. VI _Italy's comments on the situation_. |
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