the peace establishment to 479,000 men. Count Caprivi at the same time
reduced the period of compulsory service from three years to two; but
while this reform lightened the burden on the individual conscript, it
meant a great increase in the number of those who passed through
military training, and an enormous increase of the war strength. The
Franco-Russian _entente_ of 1896 was a sign that France began to feel
herself beaten in the race for supremacy and reduced to the defensive.
In 1899 the German peace strength was raised to 495,000 for the next six
years; in 1905 to 505,000. On the second of these occasions the German
Government justified its policy by pointing out that the French war
strength was still superior to that of Germany, and would become still
stronger if France should change the period of service from three years
to two. The German law was announced in 1904; it had the natural effect.
The French Senate not only passed the new law early in 1905, but also
swept away the changes which the Lower House had introduced to lighten
the burden of annual training upon territorial reserves. France found
her justification in the Moroccan episode of the previous year.

This was not unreasonable; but since that date France has been heavily
punished for a step which might be taken to indicate that _Revanche_ was
still a feature of her foreign policy. Since 1886 her utmost efforts
have only succeeded in raising her peace establishment to 545,000
(including a body of 28,000 colonial troops stationed in France), and
her total war strength to 4,000,000. In the same period the peace
establishment of Germany was raised to over 800,000, and her total war
strength of fully trained men to something like 5,400,000. It is obvious
from these figures that a policy of isolation has long ceased to be
possible to France; and that an alliance with Russia has been her only
possible method of counterbalancing the numerical superiority of the
German army, which is certainly not less well equipped or organized than