that of France.

This Russian alliance of France has been the only step in her
continental policy which could be challenged as tending to overthrow the
European balance. Undoubtedly it is France's prime offence in German
eyes; and her colonial policy has only been attacked as a pretext for
picking a quarrel and forcing on a decisive trial of strength before the
growth of Russian resources should have made her ally impregnable.

Let us now look at the German military preparations from a German point
of view. The increases of the last twenty years in military expenditure
and in fighting strength have been openly discussed in the Reichstag;
and the debates have usually run on the same lines, because the
Government up to 1912 pursued a consistent policy, framed for some years
ahead and embodied in an Army Act. The underlying principle of these
Army Acts (1893, 1899, 1905, 1911) was to maintain a fairly constant
ratio between the peace strength and the population. But the war
strength was disproportionately increased by the Caprivi Army Act of
1893, which reduced the period of compulsory service from three years to
two. The hardly-veiled intention of the German War Staff was to increase
its war resources as rapidly as was consistent with the long-sufferance
of those who served and those who paid the bill. It was taken as
axiomatic that an increasing population ought to be protected by an
increasing army. National defence was of course alleged as the prime
consideration; and if these preparations were really required by growing
danger on the two main frontiers of Germany, no German could do
otherwise than approve the policy, no foreign Power could feel itself
legitimately aggrieved.

Unfortunately it has been a maxim of German policy in recent years that