Why We Are at War (2nd Edition, revised) by Members of the Oxford Faculty of Modern History
page 78 of 302 (25%)
page 78 of 302 (25%)
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Russia. He could not therefore fall in with it.'
Sir Edward Goschen not unnaturally pointed out that 'the idea had nothing to do with arbitration, but meant that representatives of the four nations not directly interested should discuss and suggest means for avoiding a dangerous situation'.[69] Herr von Jagow spoke in the same sense to the French and Italian Ambassadors, who discussed the matter with their British colleague. Some doubt seems to have arisen in their minds as to the sincerity of the German Secretary of State's loudly expressed desire for peace; but, giving him the benefit of the doubt, they concluded that the objection must be to the 'form of the proposal'. 'Perhaps', added Sir Edward Goschen, 'he himself could be induced to suggest lines on which he would find it possible to work with us.'[70] The next day the same idea was pressed by Sir Edward Grey upon Prince Lichnowsky:-- 'The whole idea of mediation or mediating influence was ready to be put into operation by any method that Germany could suggest if mine was not acceptable.'[71] But owing to German dilatoriness in this matter, events had by then gone so far that the very gravest questions had arisen for this country. With the refusal of the German Government to propose a form of mediation acceptable to themselves before graver events had occurred, the first period of the negotiation comes to an end. The responsibility of rejecting a conference, which, by staving off the evil day, might have preserved the peace of Europe, falls solely on the shoulders of Germany. |
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