The reasons advanced by Herr von Jagow were erroneous, and though Dr.
von Bethmann-Hollweg, the Imperial Chancellor, was more conciliatory and
sympathetic, it may be noted that the German White Book[72] continues to
misrepresent Sir Edward Grey's proposal as a conference on the
particular question of the Austro-Servian dispute, and not on the
general situation of Europe.

In the period that follows come spasmodic attempts at negotiation by
direct conversations between the parties concerned, with no advantage,
but rather with the growth of mutual suspicion. Down to August 1st both
Sir Edward Grey and M. Sazonof were busy trying to find some formula
which might be accepted as a basis for postponing hostilities between
the Great Powers. And here it may be well to point out that Prince
Lichnowsky seems to have been left in the dark by his chiefs. On July
24th, the day after the Austrian note was presented, he was so little
acquainted with the true state of affairs, that speaking privately he
told Sir Edward Grey 'that a reply favourable on some points must be
sent at once by Servia, so that an excuse against immediate action might
be afforded to Austria'.[73] And in the matter of the conference, on the
very day that Herr von Jagow was making his excuses against entering the
proposed conference, Prince Lichnowsky informed Sir Edward Grey, that
the German Government accepted in principle mediation between Austria
and Russia by the four Powers, reserving, of course, their right as an
ally to help Austria if attacked.[74] The mutual incompatibility of the
two voices of Germany was pointed out from Rome, where the Marquis di
San Giuliano, the Italian Foreign Minister, attempted a reconciliation
between them, on information received from Berlin, that 'the difficulty
was rather the "conference" than the principle'.[75] But we may ask
whether Herr von Jagow's reply to Sir Edward Goschen does not really
show that the whole principle of a conference was objected to, seeing