that he said that such a 'conference was not practicable', and that 'it
would be best to await the outcome of the exchange of views between the
Austrian and Russian Governments'.[76] But, if it was not the principle
that was objected to, but only the form, where are we? We can do nothing
else but assume that the German Government objected to the terms
employed by Sir Edward Grey, and that for the sake of a mere quibble
they wasted time until other events made the catastrophe inevitable.
Impartiality will have to judge whether such action was deliberate or
not; whether in this case also it is crime or folly which has to be laid
at the door of the German Government.

The proposed conference having been rejected by Germany, an attempt was
then made by several Powers to invite Austria to suspend military
action. Although Count Mensdorff, the Austrian Ambassador in London, had
made on July 25th a distinction between military preparations and
military operations, and had urged that his Government had only the
former then in view, it was reported two days later from Rome that there
were great doubts 'whether Germany would be willing to invite Austria to
suspend military action pending the conference'. Even if she had been
willing to do so, it is very doubtful whether, in view of the Austrian
declaration of war against Servia on July 28th, and the simultaneous
Austrian decree for general mobilization, the position of Europe could
have been improved, for on July 29th that declaration was followed by
news of the Russian mobilization of the southern districts of Odessa,
Kiev, Moscow, and Kazan.[77]

Now the German Secretary of State had argued that 'if Russia mobilized
against Germany, latter would have to follow suit'. On being asked what
he meant by 'mobilizing against Germany', he said that