Why We Are at War (2nd Edition, revised) by Members of the Oxford Faculty of Modern History
page 83 of 302 (27%)
page 83 of 302 (27%)
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sovereignty of Servia'.[85] 'Preparations for general mobilization will
be proceeded with if this proposal is rejected by Austria,' wrote Sir George Buchanan.[86] The next day he reported to Sir Edward Grey that all attempts to obtain the consent of Austria to mediation had failed, and that she was moving troops against Russia as well as against Servia.[87] Face to face therefore with war against another Power, Russia ordered a general mobilization.[88] This was answered on the same day by a proclamation of _Kriegsgefahr_ at Berlin, 'as it can only be against Germany that Russian general mobilization is directed'.[89] Thus on Friday, July 31st, the situation had come to be this, that Russia, feeling herself threatened by the military preparations of Austria and Germany, decided to issue orders for a general mobilization.[90] Meanwhile Sir Edward Grey still clung to the hope that mediation with a view to safeguarding Austrian interests as against Servia might yet be accepted.[91] But his efforts were useless, for Germany had launched an ultimatum (July 31) to Russia, demanding demobilization. As Sir Edward Goschen pointed out, the demand was made 'even more difficult for Russia to accept by asking them to demobilize in the south as well'.[92] The only explanation actually vouchsafed was that this had been asked to prevent Russia pleading that all her mobilization was only directed against Austria. Such a quibble, when such interests are at stake, seems to call for severe comment. War between the three empires seemed now inevitable, for though the Emperor of Russia and the German Emperor had exchanged telegrams each imploring the other to find a way out of the difficulty, and each saying that matters had gone so far that neither could grant the other's |
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