demands,[93] the officials at Berlin were now taking up the position
that 'Russia's mobilization had spoilt everything'.[94] This attitude is
as inexplicable as it proved disastrous. For it appears that on July 31
Austria and Russia were ready to resume conversations. The Austrians,
apparently alarmed at the prospect of a general war, were ready to
discuss the substance of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia, and Russia
announced that under certain conditions 'she would undertake to preserve
her waiting attitude'.[95] Having issued her ultimatum to Russia,
Germany naturally mobilized, but what kind of diplomacy is this in
which, with the principals both ready to negotiate, a third party issues
an ultimatum couched in such terms that a proud country can give but one
answer?

The sequence of events seems to be as follows. Austria mobilized against
Servia. Russia, rightly or wrongly, took this as a threat to herself,
and mobilized all her southern forces against Austria. Then Germany
threatened to mobilize unless Russia ceased her military
preparations--an inexcusable step, which increased Russia's
apprehensions of a general war, and made a general Russian mobilization
inevitable.[96] If Russia was the first to mobilize, she took this step
in consequence of German threats. We repeat that in spite of the three
empires taking this action, discussion was still possible between Russia
and Austria,[97] and might have had good results. In fact, the situation
was not irretrievable, if Germany had not rendered it so by issuing her
ultimatum to Russia. Once again we may ask, was this crime or folly?


II

_Germany's attitude to France._