in an inexperienceable relation to an unattainable reality, this view
maintains that an idea is true if it is consistent with the rest of our
thoughts, and so can be fitted with them into a coherent system. No
doubt a coherence among our ideas is a convenience and a part of their
'working,' but it is hardly a test of their objective truth. For a
harmonious system of thoughts is conceivable which would either not
apply to reality at all, or, if applied, would completely fail. On this
theory systematic delusions, fictions, and dreams, might properly lay
claim to truth. True, they might not be quite consistent: but neither
are the systems of our sciences. If, then, this _absolute_ coherence be
insisted on, this test condemns our whole knowledge; if not, it remains
formal, and fails to recognize any distinctions of value in the claims
which can be systematized.

To avoid this _reductio ad absurdum_, it has been suggested that it is
not the coherence of the idea in human, finite, minds which constitutes
'truth,' but the perfect consistency of the experience of an Absolute
Mind. The test, then, of our limited coherency will lie in its relation
to this Absolute System. But here we have the correspondence doctrine
once again in a fresh disguise; our human systems are now 'true' if they
correspond with the Absolute's, But as there is no way for us of sharing
the Absolute Experience, our test is again illusory, and productive of a
depressing scepticism; and, again, we have only asserted that truth is
what _claims_ to be part of the Absolute System.

A word may be devoted to the simple refusal of intuitionists to give an
account of Truth on the ground that it is 'indefinable.' Truth is taken
to be an ultimate unanalyzable quality of certain propositions,
intuitively felt, and incapable of description. Error, by the same
token, should be equally indefinable and as immediately apprehended.