How, then, can there be differences of opinion, and mistakes as to what
is true and what false? How is it that a proposition which is felt to be
'true' so often turns out to be erroneous? If all errors are felt to be
true by those they deceive, is it not clear that immediate feeling is
not a good enough test of a validated truth? Thus, once again, we find
that an account of truth-claim is being foisted on us in place of a
description of truth-testing.

The intellectualist, then, being in every case unable to justify the
vital distinction commonly made between the true and the false, we
return to the pragmatist. He starts with no preconceptions as to what
truth must mean, whether it exists or not; he is content to watch how
_de facto_ claims to truth get themselves validated in experience. He
observes that every question is intimately related to some scheme of
human purposes. For it has to be _put_, in order to come into being.
Hence every inquiry arises, and every question is asked, because of
obstacles and problems which arise in the carrying out of human
purposes. So soon as uncertainty arises in the course of fulfilling a
purpose, an idea or belief is formulated _and acted on_, to fill the gap
where immediate certitude has broken down. This engenders the
truth-claim, which is necessarily a 'good' in its maker's eyes, because
it has been selected by him and judged _preferable_ to any alternative
that occurred to him.

How, then, is it tested? Simply by the consequences which follow from
adopting it and using it as an assumption upon which to work. If these
consequences are satisfactory, if they promote the purpose in hand,
instead of thwarting it, and thus have a valuable effect upon life, then
the truth-claim maintains its 'truth,' and is so far validated. This is
the universal method of testing assertions alike in the formation of