the existence of the objects referred to, and might fall into error
through asserting a relation between objects which did not exist. It is,
moreover, incapable of showing that a relation corresponding to the idea
we have of it really exists when we judge that it does.]

[Footnote E: Each perception, however, contains much that is supplied by
the mind, not 'given' to it.]




CHAPTER VI


THE FAILURE OF FORMAL LOGIC

In order to escape the necessity of concerning itself with personality
and particular circumstances in questions of truth and error,
Intellectualism appeals to Logic, which it conceives as a purely formal
science and its impregnable citadel. This appeal, however, rests on a
number of questionable assumptions, and most of these are not avowed.

1. It assumes that forms of thought can be treated in abstraction from
their matter--in other words, that the general types of thinking are
never affected by the particular context in which they occur. Now, this
means that the question of real truth must not be raised; for, as we
have seen (Chapter V.), real truth is always an affair of particular
consequences. The result is, that as truth-claims are no longer tested,
they _all pass as true_ for Logic, and are even raised to the rank of
'absolute truths,' or are mistaken for them. For the notion of a really