('materially') true judgment which someone has chosen, made, and tested,
there is substituted that of a formally valid proposition, and in the
end Logic gets so involved in the study of 'validity' that it puts aside
altogether all real tests of truth, and becomes a game with verbal
symbols which is entirely irrelevant to scientific thinking.

2. Formal Logic assumes the right of abstracting from the whole process
of making an assertion. It presumes that the assertion has already been
made somehow. How, it does not inquire. Yet it is clear that in each
case there were concrete reasons why just _that_ assertion was preferred
to any other. These concrete reasons it makes bold to dismiss as
'psychological,' and between 'logic' and 'psychology'[F] it decrees an
absolute divorce. Where, when, why, by and to whom, an assertion was
made, is taken to be irrelevant, and put aside as 'extralogical.'



3. This convenient assumption, however, ultimately necessitates an
abstraction from meaning, though Formal Logic does not avow this openly.
Every assertion is meant to convey a certain meaning in a certain
context, and therefore its verbal 'form' has to take on its own
individual _nuance_ of meaning. What any particular form of words does
in fact mean on any particular occasion always depends upon the use of
the words in a particular context. Meaning, therefore, cannot be
depersonalized; if meanings are depersonalized, they cease to be real,
and become verbal.

Formal Logic has, in fact, mistaken _words_, which are (within the same
language) identical on all occasions, for the _thoughts_ they are
intended to express, which are varied to suit each occasion. Words alone