pretence or shadow of provocation, wrested Savoy from the King of
Sardinia, and had proceeded to incorporate it likewise with France.
These were their aggressions at this period; and more than these. They
had issued an universal declaration of war against all the thrones of
Europe; and they had, by their conduct, applied it particularly and
specifically to you: they had passed the decree of November 19, 1792,
proclaiming the promise of French succour to all nations who should
manifest a wish to become free: they had, by all their language, as
well as their example, shown what they understood to be freedom: they
had sealed their principles by the deposition of their sovereign: they
had applied them to England, by inviting and encouraging the addresses
of those seditious and traitorous societies who, from the beginning,
favoured their views, and who, encouraged by your forbearance, were
even then publicly avowing French doctrines, and anticipating their
success in this country; who were hailing the progress of those
proceedings in France which led to the murder of its king: they were
even then looking to the day when they should behold a national
convention in England, formed upon similar principles.

And what were the explanations they offered on these different grounds
of offence? As to Holland, they contented themselves with telling us
that the Scheldt was too insignificant for us to trouble ourselves
about, and therefore it was to be decided as they chose, in breach of
a positive treaty, which they had themselves guaranteed, and which we,
by our alliance, were bound to support. If, however, after the war was
over, Belgium should have consolidated its liberty (a term of which
we now know the meaning, from the fate of every nation into which the
arms of France have penetrated), then Belgium and Holland might,
if they pleased, settle the question of the Scheldt by separate
negotiation between themselves. With respect to aggrandizement, they