assured us that they would retain possession of Belgium by arms no
longer than they should find it necessary for the purpose already
stated, of consolidating its liberty. And with respect to the decree
of November 19, applied as it was pointedly to you, by all the
intercourse I have stated with all the seditious and traitorous part
of this country, and particularly by the speeches of every leading
man among them, they contented themselves with asserting that the
declaration conveyed no such meaning as was imputed to it, and that,
so far from encouraging sedition, it could apply only to countries
where a great majority of the people should have already declared
itself in favour of a revolution--a supposition which, as they
asserted, necessarily implied a total absence of all sedition.

What would have been the effect of admitting this explanation?--to
suffer a nation, and an armed nation, to preach to the inhabitants of
all the countries in the world, that themselves were slaves, and their
rulers tyrants: to encourage and invite them to revolution, by a
previous promise of French support, to whatever might call itself a
majority, or to whatever France might declare to be so. This was their
explanation: and this, they told you, was their ultimatum. But was
this all? Even at that very moment, when they were endeavouring to
induce you to admit these explanations, to be contented with the
avowal that France offered herself as a general guarantee for every
successful revolution, and would interfere only to sanction and
confirm whatever the free and uninfluenced choice of the people might
have decided, what were their orders to their generals on the same
subject? In the midst of these amicable explanations with you, came
forth a decree which I really believe must be effaced from the minds
of gentlemen opposite to me, if they can prevail upon themselves for a
moment to hint even a doubt upon the origin of this quarrel, not only