the publications of Dumourier; by the publications of Brissot; by the
facts that have since come to light in America, with respect to the
mission of M. Ganet; which show that hostility against this country
was decided on the part of France long before the period when M.
Chauvelin was sent from hence. Besides this, the reduction of our
peace establishment in the year 1791, and continued to the subsequent
year, is a fact from which the inference is indisputable: a fact
which, I am afraid, shows, not only that we were not waiting for the
occasion of war, but that, in our partiality for a pacific system, we
had indulged ourselves in a fond and credulous security, which wisdom
and discretion would not have dictated. In addition to every other
proof, it is singular enough, that in a decree, on the eve of the
declaration of war on the part of France, it is expressly stated, as
for the first time, that England was then departing from that system
of neutrality which she had hitherto observed.

But, Sir, I will not rest merely on these testimonies or arguments,
however strong and decisive. I assert, distinctly and positively, and
I have the documents in my hand to prove it, that from the middle
of the year 1791, upon the first rumour of any measure taken by the
Emperor of Germany, and till late in the year 1792, we not only were
no parties to any of the projects imputed to the Emperor, but, from
the political circumstances in which we then stood with relation to
that Court, we wholly declined all communications with him on the
subject of France. To Prussia, with whom we were in connexion, and
still more decisively to Holland, with whom we were in close and
intimate correspondence, we uniformly stated our unalterable
resolution to maintain neutrality, and avoid interference in the
internal affairs of France, as long as France should refrain from
hostile measures against us and our allies. No Minister of England had