any authority to treat with foreign states, even provisionally, for
any warlike concert, till after the battle of Jemappe; till a period
subsequent to the repeated provocations which had been offered to us,
and subsequent particularly to the decree of fraternity of November
19; even then, to what object was it that the concert which we wish
to establish was to be directed? If we had then rightly cast the true
character of the French revolution, I cannot now deny that we should
have been better justified in a very different conduct. But it is
material to the present argument to declare what that conduct actually
was, because it is of itself sufficient to confute all the pretexts
by which the advocates of France have so long laboured to perplex the
question of aggression.

At that period, Russia had at length conceived, as well as ourselves,
a natural and just alarm for the balance of Europe, and applied to
us to learn our sentiments on the subject. In our answer to this
application, we imparted to Russia the principles upon which we then
acted, and we communicated this answer to Prussia, with whom we were
connected in defensive alliance. I will state shortly the leading part
of those principles. A dispatch was sent from Lord Grenville to His
Majesty's Minister in Russia, dated December 29, 1792, stating a
desire to have an explanation set on foot on the subject of the war
with France. I will read the material parts of it.

'The two leading points on which such explanation will naturally turn,
are the line of conduct to be followed previous to the commencement
of hostilities, and with a view, if possible, to avert them; and the
nature and amount of the forces which the. Powers engaged in
this concert might be enabled to use, supposing such extremities
unavoidable.