to be made "in pursuance of" that clause of the constitution which gives
to Congress "exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever" over the ten
miles square--thus, instead of _restricting_ that clause, both States
_confirm_ it. Now, their acts of cession either accorded with that
clause of the constitution, or they conflicted with it. If they
conflicted with it, _accepting_ the cessions was a violation of the
constitution. The fact that Congress accepted the cessions, proves that
in its views their _terms_ did not conflict with its constitutional
grant of power. The inquiry whether these acts of cession were
consistent or inconsistent with the United Status' constitution, is
totally irrelevant to the question at issue. What with the CONSTITUTION?
That is the question. Not, what with Virginia, or Maryland, or--equally
to the point--John Bull! If Maryland and Virginia had been the
authorized interpreters of the constitution for the Union, these acts of
cession could hardly have been more magnified than they have been
recently by the southern delegation in Congress. A true understanding of
the constitution can be had, forsooth, only by holding it up in the
light of Maryland and Virginia legislation!

We are told, again, that those States would not have ceded the District
if they had supposed the constitution gave Congress power to abolish
slavery in it.

This comes with an ill grace from Maryland and Virginia. They _knew_ the
constitution. They were parties to it. They had sifted it, clause by
clause, in their State conventions. They had weighed its words in the
balance--they had tested them as by fire; and, finally, after long
pondering, they adopted the constitution. And _afterward_, self-moved,
they ceded the ten miles square, and declared the cession made "in
pursuance of" that oft-cited clause, "Congress shall have power to