exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over such
District." And now verily "they would not have ceded if they had
_supposed_!" &c. Cede it they _did_, and in "full and absolute right
both of soil and persons." Congress accepted the cession--state power
over the District ceased, and congressional power over it
commenced,--and now, the sole question to be settled is, the _amount of
power over the District lodged in Congress by the constitution_. The
constitution--THE CONSTITUTION--that is the point. Maryland and Virginia
"suppositions" must be potent suppositions to abrogate a clause of the
United States' Constitution! That clause either gives Congress power to
abolish slavery in the District, or it does _not_--and that point is to
be settled, not by state "suppositions," nor state usages, nor state
legislation, but _by the terms of the clause themselves_.

Southern members of Congress, in the recent discussions, have conceded
the power of a contingent abolition in the District, by suspending it
upon the _consent_ of the people. Such a doctrine from _declaimers_ like
Messrs. Alford, of Georgia, and Walker, of Mississippi, would excite no
surprise; but that it should be honored with the endorsement of such men
as Mr. Rives and Mr. Calhoun, is quite unaccountable. Are attributes of
sovereignty mere creatures of contingency? Is delegated authority mere
conditional permission? Is a constitutional power to be exercised by
those who hold it, only by popular sufferance? Must it lie helpless at
the pool of public sentiment, waiting the gracious troubling of its
waters? Is it a lifeless corpse, save only when popular "consent" deigns
to puff breath into its nostrils? Besides, if the consent of the people
of the District be necessary, the consent of the _whole_ people must be
had--not that of a majority, however large. Majorities, to be
authoritative, must be _legal_--and a legal majority without legislative
power, or right of representation, or even the electoral franchise,