by southern senators, and on the ground that it "was no
compromise"--that it embodied the true southern principle--that "this
resolution stood on as high ground as Mr. Calhoun's."--(Mr.
Preston)--"that Mr. Clay's resolution was as strong as Mr.
Calhoun's"--(Mr. Rives)--that "the resolution he (Mr. Calhoun) now
refused to support, was as strong as his own, and that in supporting it,
there was no abandonment of principle by the south."--(Mr. Walker, of
Mi.)--further, that it was advocated by the southern senators generally
as an expression of their views, and as setting the question of slavery
in the District on its _true_ ground--that finally, when the question
was taken, every slaveholding senator, including Mr. Calhoun himself,
voted for the resolution.

By passing this resolution, and with such avowals, the south has
unwittingly but explicitly, conceded the main point argued in the
preceding pages, and surrendered the whole question at issue between
them and the petitioners for abolition in the District.

The _only_ ground taken against the right of Congress to abolish slavery
in the District is, that it existed in Maryland and Virginia when the
cession was made, and "_as it still continues in both of them_, it could
not be abolished without a violation of that good faith which was
implied in the cession," &c. The argument is not that exclusive
_sovereignty_ has no power to abolish slavery within its jurisdiction,
nor that the powers of even ordinary legislation cannot do it, nor that
the clause granting Congress "exclusive legislation in all cases what
soever over such District," gives no power to do it; but that the
_unexpressed expectation_ of one of the parties that the other would not
"in all cases" use the power which said party had consented might be
used "_in all cases," prohibits_ the use of it. The only cardinal point