in the discussion, is here not only yielded, but formally laid down by
the South as the leading article in their creed on the question of
Congressional jurisdiction over slavery in the District. The reason
given why Congress should not abolish, and the sole evidence that if it
did, such abolition would be a violation of "good faith," is that
"_slavery still continues in those states_,"--thus admitting, that if
slavery did _not_ "still continue" in those States, Congress could
abolish it in the District. The same admission is made also in the
_premises_, which state that slavery existed in those states _at the
time of the cession_, &c. Admitting that if it had not existed there
then, but had grown up in the District under United States' laws,
Congress might constitutionally abolish it. Or that if the ceded parts
of those states had been the _only_ parts in which slaves were held
under their laws, Congress might have abolished in such a contingency
also. The cession in that case leaving no slaves in those states,--no
"good faith" would be "implied" in it, nor any "violated" by an act of
abolition. The resolution makes virtually this further admission, that
if Maryland and Virginia should at once abolish their slavery, Congress
might at once abolish it in the District. The principle goes even
further than this, and _requires_ Congress in such case to abolish
slavery in the District "by the _good faith implied_ in the cession and
acceptance of the territory." Since, according to the spirit and scope
of the resolution, this "implied good faith" of Maryland and Virginia
in making the cession, was, that Congress would do nothing within the
District which should counteract the policy, or discredit the
"institutions," or call in question the usages, or even in any way
ruffle the prejudices of those states, or do what _they_ might think
would unfavorably bear upon their interests; _themselves_ of course
being the judges.