But let us dissect another limb of the resolution. What is to be
understood by "that good faith which was IMPLIED?" It is of course an
admission that such a condition was not _expressed_ in the acts of
cession--that in their terms there is nothing restricting the power of
Congress on the subject of slavery in the District. This "implied
faith," then, rests on no clause or word in the United States'
Constitution, or in the acts of cession, or in the acts of Congress
accepting the cession, nor on any declarations of the legislatures of
Maryland and Virginia, nor on any _act_ of theirs, nor on any
declaration of the _people_ of those states, nor on the testimony of the
Washingtons, Jeffersons, Madisons, Chases, Martins, and Jennifers, of
those states and times. The assertion rests _on itself alone!_ Mr. Clay
_guesses_ that Maryland and Virginia _supposed_ that Congress would by
no means _use_ the power given them by the Constitution, except in such
ways as would be well pleasing in the eyes of those states; especially
as one of them was the "Ancient Dominion!" And now after half a century,
this _assumed expectation_ of Maryland and Virginia, the existence of
which is mere matter of conjecture with the 36 senators, is conjured up
and duly installed upon the judgment-seat of final appeal, before whose
nod constitutions are to flee away, and with whom, solemn grants of
power and explicit guaranties are, when weighed in the balance,
altogether lighter than vanity!

But survey it in another light. Why did Maryland and Virginia leave so
much to be "_implied?_?" Why did they not in some way _express_ what lay
so near their hearts? Had their vocabulary run so low that a single word
could not be eked out for the occasion? Or were those states so bashful
of a sudden that they dare not speak out and tell what they wanted? Or
did they take it for granted that Congress would always know their
wishes by intuition, and always take them for law? If, as honorable