slavery, it _requires_ Congress to do in the District what those states
have done within their own limits, i.e., restrain _others_ from
abolishing it. Upon the same principle Congress is _bound_ to _prohibit
emancipation_ within the District. There is no _stopping place_ for this
plighted "faith." Congress must not only refrain from laying violent
hands on slavery, and see to it that the slaveholders themselves do not,
but it is bound to keep the system up to the Maryland and Virginia
standard of vigor!

Again, if the good faith of Congress to Virginia and Maryland requires
that slavery should exist in the District, while it exists in those
states, it requires that it should exist there as it exists in those
states. If to abolish _every_ form of slavery in the District would
violate good faith, to abolish _the_ form existing in those states, and
to substitute a different one, would also violate it. The Congressional
"good faith" is to be kept not only with _slavery_, but with the
_Maryland and Virginia systems_ of slavery. The faith of those states
being not that Congress would maintain a system, but _their_ system;
otherwise instead of _sustaining_, Congress would counteract their
policy--principles would be brought into action there conflicting with
their system, and thus the true sprit of the "implied" pledge would be
violated. On this principle, so long as slaves are "chattels personal"
in Virginia and Maryland, Congress could not make them _real estate_ in
the District, as they are in Louisiana; nor could it permit slaves to
read, nor to worship God according to conscience; nor could it grant
them trial by jury, nor legalize marriage; nor require the master to
give sufficient food and clothing; nor prohibit the violent sundering of
families--because such provisions would conflict with the existing
slave laws of Virginia and Maryland, and thus violate the "good faith
implied," &c. So the principle of the resolution binds Congress in all