conventions. If it is attacked on one side, it must count on support
from the other. Whether it shall continue to exist as a State and under
what conditions must depend on the result of the ensuing war and the
consequent political position--factors that lie wholly outside its own
sphere of power.

This being the case, the question may well be put whether such a State
is politically justified in requiring from its citizens in time of peace
the greatest military efforts and correspondingly large pecuniary
expenditure. It will certainly have to share the contest in which it is
itself, perhaps, the prize, and theoretically will do best to have the
largest possible military force at its disposal. But there is another
aspect of the question which is at least arguable. The fighting power of
such a State may be so small that it counts for nothing in comparison
with the millions of a modern army. On the other hand, where appreciable
military strength exists, it may be best not to organize the army with a
view to decisive campaigning, but to put the social objects of military
preparation into the foreground, and to adopt in actual warfare a
defensive policy calculated to gain time, with a view to the subsequent
interference of the prospective allies with whom the ultimate decision
will rest. Such an army must, if it is to attain its object, represent a
real factor of strength. It must give the probable allies that effective
addition of strength which may insure a superiority over the antagonist.
The ally must then be forced to consider the interests of such secondary
State. The forces of the possible allies will thus exercise a certain
influence on the armament of the State, in combination with the local
conditions, the geographical position, and the natural configuration of
the country.

It is only to be expected that, since such various conditions exist, the