high to play under unfavourable conditions. But if France thinks she has
all the trumps in her hands, she will not shrink from an offensive war,
and will stake even thing in order to strike us a mortal blow. We must
expect the most bitter hostility from this antagonist. Should the Triple
Alliance break up--as seems probable now--this hour will soon have
struck.[B] If the war then declared be waged against us in combination
with England, it may be assumed that the allied Great Powers would
attempt to turn our strategical right flank through Belgium and Holland,
and penetrate into the heart of Germany through the great gap in the
fortresses between Wesel and Flushing. This operation would have the
considerable advantage of avoiding the strong line of the Rhine and
threatening our naval bases from the land side. From the superiority of
the combined Anglo-French fleet, the army of invasion could without
difficulty have its base on our coasts. Such an operation would
enormously facilitate the frontal attack on our west frontier, and would
enable the French to push a victorious advance onward to the Rhine,
after investing Metz and Diedenhofen.

[Footnote B: Written in October, 1911.]

England, with whose hostility, as well with that of the French, we must
reckon, could only undertake a land war against us with the support of
an ally who would lead the main attack. England's troops would only
serve as reinforcements; they are too weak for an independent campaign.
English interests also lie in a quite different field, and are not
coincident with those of France.

The main issue for England is to annihilate our navy and oversea
commerce, in order to prevent, from reasons already explained, any
further expansion of our power. But it is not her interest to destroy