our position as a Continental Power, or to help France to attain the
supremacy in Europe. English interests demand a certain equilibrium
between the Continental States. England only wishes to use France in
order, with her help, to attain her own special ends, but she will never
impose on herself sacrifices which are not absolutely necessary, for the
private advantage of her ally. These principles will characterize her
plan of campaign, if she sees herself compelled by the political
position and the interests of her naval supremacy to take part in a war
against us.

If England, as must be regarded probable, determines sooner or later on
this step, it is clearly to her advantage to win a rapid victory. In the
first place, her own trade will not be injured longer than necessary by
the war; in the second place, the centrifugal forces of her loosely
compacted World Empire might be set in movement, and the Colonies might
consult their own separate interests, should England have her hands tied
by a great war. It is not unlikely that revolutions might break out in
India and Egypt, if England's forces were long occupied with a European
war. Again, the States not originally taking part in the war might
interfere in our favour, if the decision were much delayed. It was
important for us in 1870-71 to take Paris quickly, in order to forestall
any interference of neutrals. Similar conditions might arise in the case
of England. We must therefore make up our minds that the attack by sea
will be made with the greatest and most persistent vigour, with the firm
resolve to destroy completely our fleet and our great commercial
centres. It is also not only possible, but probable, that England will
throw troops on the Continent, in order to secure the co-operation of
her allies, who might demand this guarantee of the sincerity of English
policy, and also to support the naval attack on the coast. On the other
hand, the land war will display the same kind of desperate energy only