not only secure the Baltic basin for us, but also keep open the
sally-ports for our offensive operations against the English blockading
fleet.

In spite of all the advantages which the extended system of blockade
offers to the English, there are two objections against it which are
well worth considering from the English point of view. Firstly, it
prejudices the interests of a number of nations whose coasts are washed
by the North Sea and the Baltic, since they are included in the
blockade; secondly, it compels England to break up her fleet into two or
three divisions.

As to the first objection, we have hinted that England will scarcely let
herself be hindered in the pursuit of her own advantage by the interests
of weaker third parties. It is also conceivable that some satisfactory
arrangement as to the blockade can be made with the States affected. As
regards the splitting up of the fleet, no especially disadvantageous
conditions are thereby produced. It is easy to reunite the temporarily
divided parts, and the strength of the combined fleet guarantees the
superiority of the separate divisions over the German forces at sea.
Nevertheless, this division of the attacking fleet gives the defending
party the chance of attacking some detached portions before junction
with the main body, and of inflicting loss on them, if the enemy can be
deceived and surprised by prompt action. The demonstrations which are
the ordinary tactics in war on land under such conditions cannot be
employed, owing to the facility with which the sea can be patrolled.

This blockade would ultimately weaken and weary the attacking party. But
it must be recognized that it is a far easier plan to carry out than the
close blockade, and that it would tax the offensive powers of our fleet