more severely. We should not only have to venture on attacks in
far-distant waters, but must be strong enough to protect efficiently the
threatened flank of our attacking fleet.

After all, it is improbable that the English would have recourse to a
mere blockade. The reasons which would prompt them to a rapid decision
of the war have been already explained. It was shown that, in the event
of their fighting in alliance with France, they would probably attempt
to land troops in order to support their fleet from the land side. They
could not obtain a decisive result unless they attempted to capture our
naval bases--Wilhelmshaven, Heligoland, the mouth of the Elbe, and
Kiel--and to annihilate our fleet in its attempt to protect these
places, and thus render it impossible for us to continue the war by sea.

It is equally certain that our land forces would actively operate
against the English attempts at landing, and that they would afford
extraordinarily important assistance to the defence of the coast, by
protecting it against attacks from the rear, and by keeping open the
communications with the hinterland. The success of the English attack
will much depend on the strength and armament of the coast
fortifications. Such a war will clearly show their value both as purely
defensive and as offensive works. Our whole future history may turn upon
the impregnability of the fortifications which, in combination with the
fleet, are intended to guard our coasts and naval bases, and should
inflict such heavy losses on the enemy that the difference of strength
between the two fleets would be gradually equalized. Our ships, it must
be remembered, can only act effectively so long as our coast
fortifications hold out.

No proof is required that a good Intelligence system is essential to a